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Inhaling Democracy: Cigarette Advertising and
Health Education in Post-war West Germany,
1950s–1975
Rosemary Elliot*
Summary. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the West German government was faced with the chal-
lenge of addressing a damaging health behaviour, smoking, in the context of an emerging latemodern
democracy, when the precedent for addressing that behaviour was set in the Nazi past. This paper
details the two-pronged approachwhich the government took: seeking restrictions on cigarette adver-
tising, whilst educating young people to adopt positive health behaviours in the face of pressure to
smoke. This approach can be understood in the social and economic context of the time: an economic
commitment to the social market economy worked against restrictions on the sale of cigarettes; whilst
concerns about past authoritarian structures prompted the health authorities to seek novel ways of
addressing smoking, emphasising choice. In a nuanced way, post-war anti-smoking strategies were a
response to West Germany’s National Socialist past, but more importantly, a signal of an increasingly
international outlook.
Keywords: smoking; tobacco industry; West Germany; advertising health education; youth culture;
social market economy; neoliberalism
In 1974, a long article in the annual journal for young people, Durch die Weite Welt
(‘Through the wide world’), highlighted fears about drug use inWest Germany, fears amp-
lified by ‘frantic’ public discussion about ‘fashion drugs’ such as cannabis, LSD and heroin
which had grown in popularity since the late 1960s. However, the article was not illustrated
by a picture of hippies or a heroin addict, but by an image of a young boy, not even out of
short pants, having a cigarette placed in his mouth by long haired youths.1 The scene took
place against the background of a Peter Stuyvesant advert, signifying the visual and literal
presence of smoking in post-warWest German society, and embodying themoral fears sur-
rounding smoking among young people. Despite coverage accorded to illicit drug use, the
author of the article, Dr Feser from the Bundeszentrale für Gesundheitliche Aufklärung (the
Federal Centre for Health, hereafter BZGA), argued that increasing youth consumption of
‘every day’ drugs, such as tobacco and alcohol, was a far greater concern than illicit drugs.2
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1H. Feser, ‘Drogenunserer Zeit’, inDurch dieWeiteWelt,
1974, 48, 330.
2Ibid., 329.
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The article discussed the effect of cigarette advertising, suggesting that advertising created
particular expectations in the minds of consumers, from pleasant physical effects to the
promotion of a lifestyle linking smoking with social success, acting to encourage smoking.3
The message of the image and text was clear: children were at risk not only from the habits
of the ‘beat’ generation but from consumer culture and unfettered cigarette advertising.
Given the danger of smoking to health, the author argued it was necessary to counter such
advertising with health education—the goal of which should not be to create ‘anti’ advertis-
ing, but to make clear to children and young people the errors of adult ways. Once children
were aware of the errors of adult behaviour, they could then ‘come up with good reasons
to follow the new trend and not smoke’. The author explained the BZGA had been running
a health education campaign under the slogan ‘Der neue Trend—no smoking please!’4
TheNeueTrend campaignwasheraldedasacentral plankofWestGerman tobaccopolicy
in the late 1960s and 1970s. The campaign, aimed primarily at young people, is significant
firstly because it epitomises a contradictionevident inWestGermany’s tobaccopolicyduring
the second half of the twentieth century: recognition of the dangers of smoking coupled
with a widespread acceptance of tobacco use among the adult population. This contradic-
tion is apparent in otherWestern countries such as the USA and the UK, where the dangers
of smokingwere only slowly actedupon. Proctor has argued that the tobacco industry in the
United States promoted a culture of ‘denialism’ of the health risks of smoking.5 Brandt sug-
gests the tobacco industry constructed controversy to delay anti-smoking legislation.6 In the
British case, Berridge argues the slow reactionwas only partly ‘denial and delay’, giving con-
sideration to the changing context of public health, the cooperative relationship between
the tobacco industry andgovernment in the1950sand the lackof a significant anti-smoking
lobby until the early 1970s.7 In theGerman case, this paper argues therewas an acceptance
of the health risks of smoking within the cigarette industry; indeed the issue had been
acknowledged since the Nazi period. While accepting that health risks of smoking did
exist, the West German cigarette industry sought to minimise government reaction to,
and public perception of, those risks.
Secondly, the Neue Trend campaign is significant because of the content and direction
of the campaign. As Berridge and Loughlin have shown, when the British government
began to act on smoking in the early 1970s, through the recently formed Health Education
Council (HEC), they utilised mass media and poster campaigns. These campaigns relied on
graphic imagerywhich aimed to shock smokers andcreate a social stigmaaround smoking.8
The West German government explicitly rejected such an approach from the late-1960s
onwards, specifically the kind of ‘anti’ advertising Dr Feser spoke against in the article
discussed in the opening of this paper.9
3Ibid., 333.
4Ibid., 333.
5Robert N. Proctor,GoldenHolocaust;Origins of theCig-
aretteCatastropheand theCase forAbolition (Berkeley;
Los Angeles; London: University of California Press,
2011), 290–4.
6Allan M. Brandt, The Cigarette Century: The Rise, Fall
and Deadly Persistence of the Product that Defined
America (New York: Basic Books, 2007), 247.
7V. Berridge, Marketing Health: Smoking and the Dis-
course of Public Health in Britain, 1945–2000 (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2007), 48.
8Virginia Berridge and Kelly Loughlin, ‘Smoking and the
New Health Education in Britain, 1950s and 1970s’,
American Jounral of Public Health, 2005, 95, 956—64.
9Rosemary Elliot, ‘From Youth Protection to Individual
Responsibility: Addressing Smoking among Young
People in Post-war West Germany’, Medizinhistor-
isches Journal 2010, 45, 66–101.
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Finally, this paper will reconsider the accepted idea that theWest German tobacco history
case is unique as a result of the experience and legacy of the Third Reich,which, scholars have
argued, created a liberal post-war response to smoking.10 Historiography on smoking in
post-war Germany has developed from what was almost a passing statement by Robert
Proctor in 1999; namely that ‘popular memory of Nazi tobacco temperance may well have
handicapped the post-war German anti-tobacco movement’.11 Scholarship from a public
health perspective suggested that liberal attitudes combinedwith tobacco industry influence
in Germany hindered European and global anti-smoking initiatives in the early 2000s.12
The perception of a liberal stance on tobacco use in post-war West Germany is justified by
the fact that the only substantial piece of legislation on smoking prior to the early 2000swas a
clause in the 1974 Lebensmittelgesetz, or Food Law, a consumer protection law, which pro-
hibited TV and radio advertising of cigarettes.13 This law replaced a voluntary agreement to
restrict cigarette advertising to young people negotiated between theWest German govern-
ment and the cigarette industry in 1965–6 (extended in 1971).14 According to Cooper and
Kurzer, ‘Nazi efforts [against smoking] seem to have created an unspoken backlash against
the puritanical qualities of their health campaigns, resulting in post-war resistance or inhibi-
tions towards anti-tobacco campaigns by the government or medical profession’.15
However, theNeueTrend campaignshowsthat addressingsmokingremainedontheagenda.
Grüning,StrünckandGilmorehavearguedthat the impactof theNationalSocialist regimeon
post-war smokingpolicywas indirect:namely, the invasivenatureofNazipublichealthpolicy led
to health being viewed as a privatematter in the post-war period, and to a ‘dearth’ of research
into public health and epidemiology within Germany.16 As the lead in tobacco research was
taken by Great Britain and the United States from 1950 onwards, the effect of German with-
drawal from the research field was, they argue, compounded by the fact that Germany’s
healthpolicywasformedwithinanational framework, rather thaninthecontextof international
developments.Grüningandcolleagues suggest that ‘a largenon-English speakingcountrywith
self-sufficienthealth researchandpolicy-makingcapacitiescouldbeentirely inward-lookingand
isolate itself fromscientific and“policy learning” fromabroad’, further contending thatGerman
language textbooks and medical training impeded the introduction of new scientific evidence
on tobacco-related issues ‘from the English-speaking medical community elsewhere’.17
10George Davey Smith, Sabine Ströbele and Matthias
Egger, ‘Smoking and Health Promotion in Nazi
Germany’, Journal of Epidemiology and Community
Health, 1994, 48, 220—3; Robert Proctor, ‘The Nazi
War on Tobacco: Ideology, Evidence and Possible
CancerConsequences’,Bulletinof theHistoryofMedi-
cine, 1997, 71, 435—88.
11Robert Proctor, TheNaziWar onCancer (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press 1999), 228.
12A.Gilmore, E.Nolte,M.McKee, and J.Collin, ‘Continu-
ing Influence of Tobacco Industry in Germany’, The
Lancet, 2002, 360, 1255.
13
‘GesetzzurNeuordnungundBereinigungdesRechts im
Verkehrmit Lebensmitteln,Tabakerzeugnissen,kosme-
tischen Mitteln und sonstigen Bedarfsgegenständen
(Gesetz zur Gesamtreform des Lebensmittelrechts)’,
15 August 1974, §22(1) Bundesgesetzblatt, Nr 95, 20
August 1974, 1953, para. 22.
14
‘Vereinbarung über Richtlinien für die Werbung auf
dem deutschen Cigarettenmarkt’, 23 June 1965,
B102/278193. The date for the agreement is given in
additional correspondence, not on the document
itself as held here.
15A. H. Cooper and P. Kurzer, ‘Rauch ohne Feuer: Why
Germany Lags in Tobacco Control’, German Politics
and Society, 2003, 21, 24—47, 39.
16T. Grüning, C. Strünck andA. Gilmore, ‘Puffing away?
Explaining thePolitics of TobaccoControl inGermany’,
German Politics, 2008, 17, 140—64, 143; Unnamed
editorial, ‘Addiction research in Germany makes pro-
gress—however, it has a long way to go to contribute
significantly to the international community of re-
search and care’, Addiction, 96, 2001, 679—81.
17Grüning, Strünck and Gilmore, ‘Puffing Away?’ 159.
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While there isa long traditionofhealthbeingviewedasaprivatematter inGermany,which
was interrupted by the Nazis, and it is clear that the locus of smoking research shifted to
Britain and North America in the post-war years, the argument that West Germany was
‘inward-looking and isolated’ is harder to sustain.18 West German tobacco policy was not
framed in ignorance of international evidence, but in full knowledge and cognisance of it.
Archival documents suggest an awareness of what was going on in other countries and, in
thecaseofhealth education,WestGermany’s contribution to thosedebates. Thiswasappar-
ent indiscussion in theFederalMinistryofHealth (BundesministeriumfürGesundheitswesen,
hereafter BMG) in the mid-1960s about the effectiveness of British health education cam-
paigns, the lengthy English-language bibliographies in BZGA-commissioned reports, and
in West Germany’s presence at international conferences on smoking. It was also apparent
in thediscussionanddebates aroundpotential restrictionson televisionand radioadvertising
of cigarettes. Both sides of the debate (government health bodies and the cigarette industry,
mediated by the Federal Ministry of Economic Affairs [Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft])
drewon examples of policy elsewhere tomake their case. The transnational context explains
somesimilarities inpolicy focusandarguments indifferentcountriesontheuseofhealthedu-
cation and restrictions on cigarette advertising. However, the distinct social and economic
context of post-war Germany explains both the emphasis on democracy and citizenship in
health education; and the delayed introduction of any meaningful restrictions on smoking.
It is here that Proctor’s passing reference to the post-war liberal climate is relevant.
Nonetheless, the 1966 voluntary agreement stopped far short of the more restrictive
action and legislation which medical organisations and anti-smoking campaigners within
West Germany advocated, both then and in the run up to the passage of the Food Law pro-
hibiting TV and radio advertising in 1974.19 A comprehensive programme, proposed in the
Bundesrat (the legislative body representing the federal states, or Länder), to protect non-
smokers from second-hand smokewas subsequently watered down and the issue remitted
to health protection agencies and the federal states.20 Bornhäuser, McCathy and Glantz
argue that this policy dilution was because key German scientists looking at tobacco
related questionswere funded by the tobacco industry from the 1970s onwards, undermin-
ing independent research development and shaping policy decisions.21 From the 1980s
onwards, according toGrüning et al., the tobacco industry successfully emphasised the eco-
nomic contribution of tax revenue and the importance of employment provided by tobacco
manufacture and sales to the economy to counter discussion of smoking restrictions.22
18For arguments on health and the Nazis, see Sebastian
Pranghofer andAndreas-HolgerMaehle, ‘Limits of Pro-
fessional Secrecy: Medical Confidentiality in England
and Germany in the Nineteenth and Early Twentieth
Centuries’, Interdisciplinary Science Reviews, 2006,
31, 231–44.
19See various correspondence in B149/28271, including
to DHS, 29 May, 1973 and to Ärztliche Arbeitskreis
Rauchen und Gesundheit, April 1973.
20A. Börnhauser, J. McCarthy and S. A. Glantz ‘German
Tobacco Industry’s Successful Efforts toMaintain Scien-
tific and Political Respectability to Prevent Regulation of
Secondhand Smoke’, Tobacco Control, 2006, 15, elec-
tronic pages (<http://www.tobaccocontrol.com/cgi/
content/full/15/2/e1>). doi:10.1136/tc.2005.012336,
Last accessed 24 February 2015.
21Bornhäuser, McCarthy and Glantz, ‘German Tobacco
Industry’s Successful Efforts’, See also T. Grüning and
A. Gilmore, ‘Tobacco Industry Influence on Science
and Scientists in Germany’, American Journal of
Public Health, 2006, 96, 20—32.
22Grüning, Strünck and Gilmore, ‘Puffing Away?’
151–2.
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While thesepointswereundoubtedly the case; theeconomic contributionof tobaccowas
akeyplankof the cigarette industry’s lobbying strategy fromtheearly 1950s, if notbefore.23
This paper will argue that, whilst the BMGwas aware of international epidemiological evi-
denceonsmoking, theMinistrywas constrained in its responsebyestablisheddomestic rela-
tionships and networks between the cigarette industry, the scientific community and other
branches of government which pre-dated its formation in 1961 and date back to the Third
Reich. These relationships altered slightly, but not seismically, with the foundation of the
BZGA. Further, while such networks existed in other countries, the economic issues at
stake in the German case stretched to the very conceptualisation of West German recon-
struction.24 The economic circumstances of post-war West Germany, that is, the commit-
ment to free trade within the context of the social market economy, worked against
introducing restrictive practices, seen as ‘economic authoritarianism’, in the sale,marketing
and advertising of cigarettes (and other goods). This is apparent in the difficulties that arose
in getting even a voluntary agreement on tobacco advertising acceptedwithin the post-war
West German liberal economic context. The commitment to free trade within the social
market economy developed fromwar-time arguments of the Freiburg School of Economics
but was also seen by the United States as central to West Germany’s rehabilitation in the
West.
Further, theNeueTrend campaigngoes far beyondpublicising thehealth risks of smoking
to address what it meant to be a citizen in a modern, liberal, consumer society. This was a
response to the social and political context of 1960s West Germany. Questions of liberty
and democracy came to the fore with vocal protest movements against the perceived
authoritarianism of the previous decades, and generational tensions around the issue of
the National Socialist past, emerging youth culture and the international climate of the
Cold War.25 The pressure for democracy in the context of liberal citizenship raised issues
for theWestGermangovernment over how to shape individual behaviourwithout being re-
pressive,when theprecedent for government interventionon smokingwas theNational So-
cialist period, and when smoking was seen as routine and socially acceptable.
The health education campaign links to the context of economic liberalism: by the early
1970s, smoking policy was clearly informed by the liberal ideal of a citizen exercising
choice, informed by experts, in a market economy. Thus, the Neue Trend campaign can
be read as an example of neo-liberal governmentality. The campaign sought to provide
young people with the means of interpreting and making health choices within a largely
pro-smoking culture (construed as a nexus of tobacco industry marketing, advantageous
fiscal policy and familial, peer and social pressure to smoke). There was no suggestion
that health education could change this culture; the aim was to teach young people to
negotiate it.
23R. Elliot, ‘Smoking for Taxes: the Triumph of Fiscal
Policy over Health’, Economic History Review, 2012,
65, 1450–74.
24Peter Taylor, Smoke Ring: the Politics of Tobacco
(London: Bodley Head, 1984).
25Mathias Frese, Julia Paulus and Karl Teppe, eds,
Demokratisierung und gesellschaftlicher Aufbruch:
Die sechziger Jahre als Wendezeit der Bundesrepublik
(Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöning, 2003); C. von
Hodenberg, ‘Mass Media and the Generation of Con-
flict: West Germany’s Long Sixties and the Formation
of a Critical Public Sphere’, Contemporary European
History, August 2006, 15, 367—95; Nick Thomas,
Protest Movements in 1960s West Germany: A Social
History of Dissent and Democracy (Oxford: Berg,
2003).
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Government ministers, even from the BMG, were clear that their goal in smoking policy
generally, to quote a 1974 statement, was ‘not to force healthy behaviour by laws or pres-
sure [but] to awaken reason and criticism’.26 The post-warWest German casewas different
from the ‘denial and delay’ posited elsewhere: the health risks of smoking were acknowl-
edged, but minimised by the tobacco industry, and located within the realm of individual
choice by both the tobacco industry and the BMG. The debate, within the context of
neo-liberal economic freedom, was around the point at which the state could intervene.
As such, arguments in West Germany are relevant to understanding UK and American
debates on smoking and health, and to broader arguments around state intervention in a
range of health behaviours today.
Cigarette Advertising and Health in 1950s West Germany
The risks of smoking were generally established internationally with the publication of the
report by the Royal College of Physicians of London (hereafter RCP) in 1962, Smoking
and Health, and the US Surgeon General’s report, Smoking and Health, in 1964.27 The
reportswere covered in thenewsandperiodicalpress inWestGermanyanddiscussed inpar-
liament.28 Thiswas just oneof a series of flashpoints for theWestGermancigarette industry,
rather than a pivotal moment. The industry had responded vociferously and repeatedly to
Nazi anti-smoking campaigns, in order to protect their interests.29 This is different to the
British and US scenarios where smoking had been positively endorsed through the
Second World War.30 In the post-war years, tobacco firms and trade organisations
lobbied thenewWestGermangovernment in supportof the re-establishmentof thedomes-
tic tobacco industry in the faceof the smugglingofVirginia cigarettes and international com-
petition.31 This lobbying positioned tobacco as an important element of post-war economic
and trade policy, despite lingering concerns about the health risks of smoking in the early
1950s. Thus, the West German cigarette industry had substantial experience of lobbying
the government in the face of health and other concerns.
Through the 1950s, the West German cigarette industry responded to emerging inter-
national evidence on smoking and health by engaging prominent scientists, such as Druck-
erey in Freiburg and Wynder at the Sloan Kettering Institute in New York, to work on the
question of smoking and lung cancer, including biological experiments to isolate the
carcinogenic compounds in tobacco condensate.32 The West German cigarette industry
set up the Scientific Research Institute of the Association of Cigarette Manufacturers
26Deutscher Bundestag, 7/2070, 10 May 1974, 11.
27SmokingandHealth: Summary of aReport of theRoyal
College of Physicians of London on Smoking in Rela-
tion to Cancer of the Lung and Other Diseases
(London: Pitman Medical Publishing Co., Ltd, 1962);
Smoking and Health: Report of the Advisory Commit-
tee to the Surgeon General of the Public Health
Service (US Department of Health, Education and
Welfare, 1964).
28For example, theweekly periodical,Der Spiegel, ran an
eight-page article featured as the main cover story on
22 January 1964. ‘Forschung: rauchen’, Der Spiegel,
22 January 1964, 60—8; Deutscher Bundestag,
4. Wahlperiode, 22 Sitzung, 22 March 1962, p. 788;
Deutscher Bundestag, 4. Wahlperiode, 109 Sitzung,
24 January 1964, p. 5028.
29See, for example, Hamburger Institut für Sozial-
forschung, PFR (hereafter PFR) 140—1, Letter from
Phillip F. Reemtsma to Berchard Köhler, Kommission
für Wirtschaftspolitik der NSDAP, 28 February 1939.
30RosemaryElliot, ‘FromTobacco in theWar to theWaron
Tobacco: Smoking in Britain andGermany from c.1900
to 1945’, in F. Huisman and H.Oosterhuis, eds, Health
and Citizenship: Political Cultures of Health in Modern
Europe (London: Pickering andChatto, 2013), 141–54.
31Elliot, Smoking for Taxes, 1457–60.
32PFR 480, 08; 480, 12, various correspondence.
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(Wissenschäftliche Forschungstelle of the Verband der Cigaretten-Industrie; hereafter the
Scientific Research Institute) in 1959 to look at both the statistical basis of risk and the toxi-
cology of smoking, with the input of universities and the Federal Health Office (Bundesge-
sundheitsamt) itself.33 The Federal Health Office was the body responsible for recognising
and assessing health risks in West Germany. West German cigarette manufacturers were
thus able to argue they were addressing health concerns by undertaking research work to
create a less harmful cigarette—with scientific and government support.
Similarly, cigarette manufacturers engaged with concerns about cigarette advertising in
theWestGerman context.Manufacturers remainedgovernedby legislation, theNikotinver-
ordnung, implemented during the National Socialist period, which prohibited health claims
about cigarettes.34 In the Third Reich, this related to low nicotine cigarettes, but by the
1950s, concern focused on advertising for the US Virginia blend filter cigarettes which
were growing in popularity in West Germany. In 1952, Phillip Reemtsma, head of the firm
Reemtsma, criticisedanadvertising campaign for theUS filter cigaretteGloria (BritishAmeri-
can Tobacco) as irresponsible, believing that the slogan ‘Genuss ohne Reue (Enjoyment
without regrets)’ misled consumers into believing they could smoke without harm.35
WestGermanmanufacturerswere uneasy about the shift in themarket towards USVirginia
blend filter cigarettes; arguably, it suited them to adopt a strict position onadvertisingwhich
suggested the health benefits of filter cigarettes.36
Reemtsma’s comments also reflect concern that overstepping the line regarding health
claims for cigarettes would incite opposition from ‘the medical enemies of the cigarette’
and lead to statutory regulation through the Food Law.37 The German Agency against
Addiction (Deutsche Hauptstelle gegen die Suchtgefahren, hereafter DHS) registered its
alarm at the proliferation and content of cigarette advertising in 1957, citing the increase
in ‘suggestive’ advertising and the need to protect the family, in particular children, from
the dangers of alcohol and tobacco use. This put the issue within a moral as well as a
medical framework.38
Correspondence about the 1966 voluntary agreement from the Verband der Cigarette-
nindustrie (the trade association representingWest German cigarettemanufacturers; here-
after VdC) explains that the VdC had been careful since the mid-1950s not to participate
in ‘Americanised’ advertising which emphasised health arguments for filter cigarettes.39
Correspondence in the Reemtsma archive dating from 1959 refers to an earlier agreement
33PFR 485, 08, Protokoll über die Sitzung des Gründerk-
reises einer Forschungsgemeinschaft der Cigarette-
nindustruie am 29.1.1959 im Büro des VdC.
34PFR 480, 11Notiz zur VdC—Beiratsitzung. Gedanken-
gänge zum Thema: Nikotin-Verordnung.
35PFR 485, 05 Philipp Reemtsma to Emil Jacob, 21
January 1952.
36On concerns about US cigarettes, see C. Merki, ‘Die
amerikanische Zigarette—das Mass aller Dinge:
Rauchen’, in T.HengartnerandC.Merki, eds,Tabakfra-
gen: Rauchen aus kulturwissenschaftlicher Sicht
(Zürich, 1996), 57–82; for discussion of attitudes to ad-
vertising, see PFR 485, 08 II. Übereinkunft zur Vorbeu-
gung gegen den Gebrauch von diskriminierenden
Gesundheitsargumenten, 28 July 1958.
37PFR 480, 11 Notiz zur VdC-Beiratssitzung: Gedanken-
gänge zum Thema: Nikotin-Verordnung, 8May 1959.
38D. Reingard, Von der Reklame zum Marketing:
Geschichte der Wirtschaftswerbung in Deutschland
(Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1993), 44—8; C. Ross, ‘The
Americanisation of Advertising in Interwar Germany’,
in P. E. Swett, J. S.Weisen, and J. R. Zatlin, SellingMod-
ernity: Advertising in Twentieth Century Germany
(Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2007), 52—77;
Staatsarchiv Hamburg, 352–6/1250 Bundestagung
der Deutschen Hauptstelle gegen die Suchtgefahren,
Entschliessungen der Arbeitsgemeinschaften am 16
Oktober 1957.
39Bundesarchiv (hereafter BArch) B102/278193 VdC to
the BWM, 8 February 1966.
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betweenmember firmsand theFederalHealthOffice (Bundesgesundheitsamt) not toadver-
tise ‘particular effects’ of filters.40 This agreement allowed the industry to argue they were
restricting health claims about filters in advertising, andpersuade the FederalMinistry of the
Interior, responsible for public health legislation at that point, that a re-drafting of theNiko-
tinverordnungwas unnecessary.41 Thus, many of the arguments which came to the fore in
the 1960s around smoking, cigarette advertising andhealth had their origins in theprevious
decade.
Restricting Advertising and the 1957 Anti-Cartel Law
By the timeof thepublicationof theRCP report in 1962, therewereestablished relationships
between the cigarette industry, scientists and sections of the West German government
which helped shape the policy response in ensuing decades. The structure of the West
German health systemmeant that policy on smoking and health had been largely devolved
to the Länder since 1949.42 Therewas nonational body, prior to the founding of the BMG in
1961, to address concerns about smoking. The BMG was created from different parts of
existing government ministries, which explains the persistence of existing networks.43
HealthMinister, Elisabeth Schwarzhaupt, was interested in smoking from the outset. Fol-
lowingpublicationof theRCP report, Schwarzhaupt asked theCommissiononTobaccoand
Health, set up under the auspices of Federal Health Office at her request, to review the
evidence in the report.44 The recommendations of the Commission guided policy to
come. The Commission accepted RCP report findings that smoking was injurious to
health; with the caveat that statistical associations, on which much of the evidence was
based, were not enough to prove causation. Whereas the RCP report concluded that
animal experiments were of no relevance to proving the cause of lung cancer, the West
German Commission believed such experiments were valuable, not least because the
West German cigarette industry had funded such research for almost a decade. The Com-
mission recommended intensifying existing research at the Scientific Research Institute
looking at the statistical basis of risk and the toxicology of smoking,with the input of univer-
sities and the Federal Health Office itself.45 This was a continuation of arrangements which
had grown up in the 1950s: the Commission dismissed the idea of setting up a centrally
funded research institute into smoking and health, because of the financial loss for existing
centres and the professional implications for scientists removed from their existing institu-
tional settings.46 The National Socialist precedent for a centrally funded tobacco research
institute was not mentioned.
40PFR485,08,ProtokollübereineAussprachezwischenden
Vertretern der Firmen Brinkmann, GmbH, Hamburg,
British American Tobacco Company (CE) Hamburg,
Kyriazi Frères Cigarettenfabrik GmbH, Hamburg, Haus
Neuerburg, Köln; HF and PhF Reemtsma, Hamburg, 29
July 1958. The threat of legislation is specifically discussed
in 1959, see PFR 485, 08 Protokoll über die Sitzung des
Gründerkreises einer Forschungsgemeinschaft der Cigar-
ettenindustrie am 29.1.1959 im Büro des VdC.
41PFR 480, 11 Notiz zur VdC-Beiratssitzung: Gedanken-
gänge zum Thema: Nikotin-Verordnung, 8May 1959.
42H. Sons, ‘Zur ReorganisationdesÖffentlichenGesund-
heitsdienstes im Nachkriegsdeutschland—dargestellt
am Beispiel Nordrhein-Westfalens (Britische Besat-
zungszone) 1945–1949’, Das Öffentliche Gesund-
heitswesen, 1985, 47, 273–7.
43U. Lindner, Gesundheitspolitik in der Nachkriegszeit:
Grobbritannien und die Bundesrepublik Deutschland
im Vergleich (München, 2004), 42.
44Elisabeth Schwarzhaupt, Deutscher Bundestag,
4. Wahlperiode, 22. Sitzung, 22 March 1962, 788.
45BArchB310/302DerPräsidentdesBundesgesundheit-
samtes an den Herrn Bundesminister für Gesundheits-
wesen, 12 September 1962.
46Ibid., 9–10.
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The Commission made a number of broader recommendations, including that the gov-
ernment reach an agreement with the cigarette industry about advertising; that smoking
on public transport be prohibited; that sales to young people be prohibited; that filters
reach minimum requirements in terms of removing nicotine and tar products; and that
health education be targeted at young people. These recommendations were similar to
those put forward in the original report, although the West German committee argued
the British experience showedgeneral health education campaigns to be largely ineffective,
and efforts should focus on preventing youth smoking.47 This fits the context of a historical
precedent for targetting young people in health education dating from the First World
War.48
Medical and anti-smoking advocacy groups within Germany were explicit in their
demands for a strong response to the RCP report. An article in a weekly medical journal,
the Münchener Medizinische Wochenschrift, entitled ‘Are the English ahead of us in re-
search, recognition and preventive work against the dangers of smoking?’ (‘Sind die Eng-
länder uns voraus in Forschung, Erkenntnis und Abwehr der Gefahren des Rauchens?’),
criticised the BMG for their lack of action, citing presumed fears of losing revenue from
tobacco taxes. The article discussed British research, but made no mention of research
and anti-smoking propaganda during the Nazi period.49 The article was based on a paper
at a symposium for West German doctors on smoking and health, in May 1962. The dele-
gates put forward 12 recommendations, including prohibiting tobacco as much cigarette
advertising was aimed at teenagers and young people in their twenties.50 Similar
demands were made by the Deutsche Hauptstelle gegen die Suchtgefahren.51
Nonetheless, HealthMinister Schwarzhauptwas clear that anoutright banonadvertising
andbroader restrictionson smokingwerenotheraims. Shestated, in response to the recom-
mendations of the DHS in particular for a ban on advertising, in October 1962:
[T]he suggestions of the German Agency against Addiction deserve a thorough exam-
ination. I think, however, that prohibition and punishment are less likely to prevent the
misuse of Genuβmitteln than a broadly based health education campaign for the
general population, particularly aimed at young people.52
Itwasnecessary, she continued, to influence youngpeople’s attitudes towards smokingand
thus prevent them from taking it up. This focus on changing attitudes rather than using re-
strictive legislation endured in the years which followed. Schwarzhaupt explained that the
BMG had negotiated with the VdC, resulting in the latter’s commitment not to undertake
advertising which was directed at young people.53 Within the Health Ministry, the starting
point was negotiationwith the tobacco industry to restrict advertising and education of the
47Ibid., 11.
48Rosemary Elliot, ‘From Youth Protection to Individual
Responsibility’, 66–101.
49Guido Möring, ‘Sind die Engländer uns voraus in For-
schung, Erkenntnis und Abwehr der Gefahren des
Rauchens?’,MünchenerMedizinischeWochenschrift,
28 September 1962, 104, 1837—9.
50P. Bernhard, ‘Die Wirkung des Rauchens auf Frau und
Mutter’, Münchener Medizinische Wochenschrift, 28
September 1962, 104, 1831.
51Hammersen (FDP), Deutscher Bundestag, 4. Wahlper-
iode, 43. Sitzung, 25 October 1962, p. 1873A.
52Genussmittel are victuals, such as alcohol or tobacco,
which are not consumed for nutrition or satiety, but
for some physiologically enjoyable effect. There is no
direct translation in English.
Schwarzhaupt, Bundesminister für Gesundheitswe-
sen, Deutscher Bundestag, 43 Sitzung, 25 Oktober
1962, 1872C.
53Ibid., 1872D.
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population, particularly young people, rather than legislation against either advertising or
smoking itself.
This negotiation took the form of proposing a voluntary agreementwith the implicit threat
of legislation. In 1965, Secretary of State for Health, Bargatzky, noted that the BMG were
continuing their efforts to negotiate a voluntary agreement on tobacco advertising. Answer-
ing a parliamentary question in 1965 about the increase in cigarette consumption in West
Germany, despite media coverage of the US Surgeon General’s report on smoking and
health, Bargatzky took ownership of this proposed voluntary agreement, stating:
‘I have grounds to presume that the cigarette industry will shortly enter into an agree-
ment, suggested by me, to restrict excessive advertising’ (author’s emphasis).54
Bargatzky noted a draft bill to remove cigarette advertising from television, but stressed the
need to await the voluntary agreement and its effect before taking any further steps.
The desire for self-regulation through voluntary agreements in the mid-1960s was a
strategy adopted by the cigarette industry in countries such as the UK and the USA to
avoid more restrictive legislation.55 Such agreements were inadequately enforced, and
gave the perception of action on healthwithminimal disadvantage to the tobacco industry.
The problems inWest Germany related less to lack of enforcement (West German compan-
ies were keen tomonitor infringements of the legislation amongst competitors, particularly
US ones!) andmore to the legality of such an agreementwithin the post-war context of dec-
artelisation. In May 1964, BMG staff member, Dr Zoller, met with colleagues at the Federal
Ministry of Economic Affairs (Bundesministerium fürWirtschaft, hereafter BMWi) to discuss
the proposals. The memo of this meeting shows that the desire for a voluntary agreement
met with opposition within the BMWi and was by no means fully endorsed even by all at
the BMG. All present, including Zoller, shared the view that advertising was not a cause
of youth smoking; excessive advertising was already covered by the Nikotinverordnung;
there was no practical gain to be expected from a prohibition on tobacco advertising; and
health education would have more of an effect. Nonetheless, Zoller stressed that Schwarz-
haupt was determined to push ‘measures’ through, although he also explained that he had
good ties to thecigarette industry fundedResearch Institute and thathehadpersonally been
able to prevent ‘misunderstandings’ arising.56 It is not clear what ‘misunderstandings’ are
referred to; nonetheless the relationships between the BMWi, the cigarette industry and
members of the BMG are clear. The final point which Zoller raised is crucial to understand
the liberal approach to smoking in post-war West Germany. He questioned whether a vol-
untary agreement on cigarette advertising would infringe the 1957 Law Against Restraints
on Competition (Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen, hereafter GWB).
Briefly put, the legitimacy of the post-war West German state was based upon economic
freedom, within the social market economy, which was a reaction and response to previous
decades of ‘economic authoritarianism’.57 As Berghahn has shown, Ludwig Erhard
54Bargatzky, Deutscher Bundestag, 171 Sitzung, 11
March, 1965, 8607B.
55Brandt, The Cigarette Century, 258—9.
56BArch B102/278193 Vermerk: Betr: Einschränkung
der Werbung für Tabakwaren und alkoholische
Getränke, 25 May 1964.
57A. J. Nicholls, Freedom with Responsibility: The Social
Market Economy in Germany, 1918–1963, (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1994).
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(theMinister of Finance from1949 to1963, andChancellor ofWestGermany from1963–66)
was closely connected to, and influencedby, the argumentsof the Freiburg School in the early
1940s. The Freiburg School opposed the planned economy of the Nazis, and argued for a
post-war freemarket economy,which dismantled existing cartels, andwas directed at civilian
consumption.58 This distinctlyGerman strandof liberal thoughtwas knownasOrdoliberalism
after the journal published by the Freiburg School.59 Erhard himself set up an institute for re-
search into consumerism, which was supported, among other industrialists, by Reemtsma.60
Later, in 1951, Erhard became a member of the internationally focused neo-liberal Mont
Pelerin Society.61 In 1948, he had argued in a speech that ‘only a state that establishes both
the freedom and the responsibility of its citizens can legitimately speak in the name of the
people’.62 It is this interaction of freedom and responsibility which shaped West German
smoking policy.
The US occupying authorities were also keen to prevent economic concentrations of
power, and saw this as key toWest Germany’s integration into the new international com-
munity.63While US planners advocated decartellisation, the US vision was slightly different
from Ordoliberalism, as the US envisaged the survival of larger West German corporations
which could compete on the global stage and drive European economic growth.64 This
point explains why large companies like Reemtsma were allowed to rebuild after the war
and were seen as important to West Germany’s reconstruction.
In the early 1950s, the nascent neo-liberal climate countered any limits on competition.
Long and protracted discussions to limit cartels and protect free competition led to the
1957 GWB which aimed to prevent monopolies and the distortion of the free market. For
Erhard, the 1957 GWB was the economic equivalent to the 1949 Grundgesetz (Basic
Law); both created the framework within which the liberal-democratic economy and
society would operate.65 The 1957 GWB established the Federal Cartel Office (Bundeskar-
tellamt), a bodywhichwouldmonitor theworkingsof theGWB. Inpractice, theGWBmeant
that the cigarette industry couldnotagree to limit advertising, ormodifyproducts ina certain
way,withoutbreaching this law,becauseof theperceivedeffects on free competition.Man-
ufacturers had to show that such agreementswere aimed at preventing harm. For example,
carmanufacturers hadagreednot to advertise the top speedof their vehicles, andnot to add
radiator mascots which endangered others in traffic, in order to cut traffic accidents and
fatalities.66
58Volker Berghahn, Ludwig Erhard, die Freiburger Schule
und das ‘Amerikanische Jahrhundert’, Freiburg Discus-
sion Papers on Constitutional Economics, 10/1, 2010.
<http://www.eucken.de/fileadmin/bilder/Dokumente/
Diskussionspapiere/10_01bw.pdf>, Last accessed 24
February 2015.
59Graham Burchell, ‘Liberal Government and Technolo-
gies of the Self’, Economy and Society, 1993, 22,
267—82, 270.
60Berghahn, Ludwig Erhard, die Freiburger Schule und
das ‘Amerikanische Jahrhundert’, 7.
61Philip Mirowski and Dieter Plewhe, The Road from
Mont Pelerin: The Making of the Neoliberal Thought
Collective (Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard Uni-
versity Press, 2009), 22.
62Ludwig Erhard quoted inMichel Foucault, The Birth of
Biopolitics: Lectures at the Collège de France 1978—
79, ed. Michel Senellert; trans. Graham Burchell
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 81.
63Hannah L. Buxbaum, ‘German Legal Culture and the
Globalization of Competition Law: A Historical Per-
spective on the Expansion of Private Antitrust Enforce-
ment’, Berkeley Journal of International Law, 2005,
23, 478–9.
64Berghahn, Ludwig Erhard, die Freiburger Schule und
das ‘Amerikanische Jahrhundert’, 8.
65Ibid., 12.
66BArch B102/278193 Memo: Einschränkung der
Werbung für Tabakwaren, 30 May 1964.
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Thus, in order for the voluntary agreement on advertising not to breach theGWB, the cig-
arette industry had to be clear that it aimed to limit potential harm to the general public (a
point which implied an acceptance of the health risks of smoking). In its original form, the
voluntary agreement of 1965–66 reflected concern about smoking among young people,
focusing on curtailing advertising seen to appeal to youth smokers, both in terms of the
content and placing of advertising.67 The Federal Cartel Office objected to the agreement
on the grounds that, in their view, such restrictions could not be seen as a health measure
as the tobacco industry did not propose to restrict advertising expenditure as a whole. As
far as the Federal Cartel Office were concerned, if the proposals would not lead to a reduc-
tion in cigarette industry profits (indicating a reduction in consumption), the agreement had
no relevance in health terms, and therefore breached the terms of the law.68
Between 1964 and 1966, both the VdC and the BMG sought to convince the Federal
Cartel Office that a voluntary agreement restricting advertising to young people would
not affect competition in the cigarette market.69 Again, Bargatzky was clear that the initia-
tive for the voluntary agreement had come from the BMG, and that its failure due to oppos-
ition from the Federal Cartel Office would threaten not only the credibility of the VdC, but
that of the Federal Health Minister herself.70 In the end, the ‘qualitative’ sections of the
agreement which limited the imagery used in advertising, such that it should not appeal
to young people, were accepted but the ‘quantitative’ clause to limit the placing of print
media andbillboardadvertisingwasnot.71 Thus, thewider post-war economic commitment
to freemarket competition expressed in lawworked against restricting the tobacco trade in
any meaningful way, and forced the cigarette industry and the Federal Health Ministry to
cooperate to gain even minimal concessions.
Teaching Responses to Advertising: Social and Political Influences
At the same time, the social climateof the late1960sandearly 1970smeant that a repressive
approach towards smoking was politically unpalatable. The period between the late 1950s
and the mid-1970s in West Germany was a period of transformation. The material factors
ensuring a good standard of living for many West Germans were secured in the 1950s
through the economic recovery and a robust social system.72 The 1960s saw rising dispos-
able income and increased international travel changing people’s outlook, while political
and cultural alignment with the United States and other Western democracies set West
Germany increasingly in a western way of life.73 A change of leadership from the conserva-
tive Christian Democrats to the Social Democrats, as well as a generational change in the
social elite, provided the impetus to challenge conservative attitudes.
67BArch B102/278194 Richtlinien für die Werbung auf
dem deutschen Cigarettenmarkt, undated, accom-
panying correspondence notes that it was agreed 23
June 1965.
68BArch B102/278194 Vermerk: Beschränkung der
Werbung für Zigaretten, 21 December 1965 and
related correspondence.
69BArch B102/278193 Vdc to Staatssekretär Langer,
Bundeswirtschaftsministerium, 8 February 1966.
70BArch B102/278193 Bundesministerium für
Gesundheitswesen to Staatssekretär Langer, Bundes-
wirtschaftsministerium, 14 February 1966.
71BArch B102/278193 Bundeskartellamt to Bundesmin-
ister für Wirtschaft, 21 March 1966.
72M.Wildt, ‘Plurality of Taste: Food and Consumption in
West Germany during the 1950s’, History Workshop
Journal, 1995, 39, 22—41.
73A. Schildt and A. Schildt, ‘From Reconstruction to
“Leisure Society”: Free Time, Recreational Behaviour
and the Discourse on Leisure Time in the West
German Recovery Society of the 1950s’,Contemporary
European History, 1996, 5, 191—222.
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Liberalising protest movements were also an international phenomenon, spurred by op-
position to theVietnamWarandnuclearweapons, and thedemand for civil rights.74 InWest
Germany, examination of the National Socialist past and questions of democratic participa-
tion and pluralitymeant that suchmovements assumedheightened significance.75 Cultural
transformation towards a more liberal state in the 1960sWest Germany was, according to
authors such as Ulrich Herbert, not only fast, but accompanied by an unusually high level of
political andpublic acceptance.76WhenChancellorWilly Brandt enteredoffice in 1969with
the slogan ‘WirwollenmehrDemokratiewagen’, itwas symbolic of thewider acceptanceof
these cultural changes.77
One aspect of this cultural shift was that anxieties about the negative effects of modern
cultureonyoungpeoplewere increasingly seenasoutdated. Siegfriedhas shownthatby the
later 1960s youngpeoplewere seen as the arbiters ofmodernmodes of leisure, fashion and
music, and that adults, while conflicted about some aspects of new lifestyles, sought to ne-
gotiate cultural change.78 The more open, liberal climate from the late 1960s meant that
therewas aneed tomaintain, andbe seen tomaintain, individual freedomas a fundamental
condition of a democratic society. As theorists from Foucault onwards have shown in rela-
tion to the concept of ‘governmentality’, strategies of government in advanced liberal soci-
etiesdonotarticulate traditional formsof authoritarianpower, butgain validity, in thewords
of Nikolas Rose, through the ‘domains of market, civil society and citizenship’. The tasks of
government are to foster self-regulation and self-control in order to govern ‘free citizens’.79
From1967,healtheducationcampaignsat a federal levelweredesignedandcoordinatedby
theBundeszentrale fürGesundheitlicheAufklärung, a bodywhichwas set up in place of the
existing body, the Deutsche Gesundheitsmuseum (DGM).80 Frankenberg has called the
BZGA ‘underfundedand inadequate’and it is true that theBZGAsuffered fromfundingcon-
straints.81 Nonetheless, the campaignmaterial produced by the BZGAwas constantly cited
by members of government as a key plank of the anti-smoking strategy, and provides an
insight into the way in which various strategies of governmentality operated in relation to
smoking. Smoking, alongside sex education, was one of the key campaign foci of the late
1960s; in the early 1970s, this broadened to include drugs education.82
74Holger Nehring, ‘National Internationalists: British and
West German Protests against Nuclear Weapons, the
Politics of Transnational Communications and the
SocialHistory of theColdWar, 1957—1964’.Contem-
porary European History, 2005, 14, 559—82.
75N. Thomas, Protest Movements in 1960s West
Germany: A Social History of Dissent and Democracy
(Oxford, New York: Berg, 2003).
76Ulrich Herbert, ‘Liberalisierung als Lernprozeβ: Die Bun-
desrepublik in der DeutschenGeschichte—eine Skizze’
in Herbert, ed., Wandlungsprozesse in Westdeutsch-
land, Belastung, Integration and Liberalisierung
1945—1980 (Wallstein Verlag, Göttingen, 2002), 8–9.
77Brandt (Bundeskanzler), Deutsche Bundestag,
6. Wahlperiode, 5. Sitzung, 28 October 1969, p. 20C.
78Detlef Siegfried, ‘Don’t Trust Anyone Older Than 30?’
Voices of Conflict and Consensus between
Generations in 1960sWest Germany’, Journal of Con-
temporary History, 2005, 40, 727—44.
79Nikolas Rose, ‘Government, Authority and Expertise in
Advanced Liberalism’, Economy and Society, 1993,
22, 283—99.
80V. Hübel, Bundeszentrale für Gesundheitliche Aufklär-
ung, B310, 1948—1981, Bundesarchiv Koblenz, 2001,
7.
81Günther Frankenberg, ‘Between paternalism and vol-
untarism: tobacco consumption and tobacco control
in Germany’, in E.A. Feldman and R. Bayer (eds.)Unfil-
tered: conflicts over tobacco policy and public health,
(Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University
Press) 2004, 175; BArch B310/290 Projektliste für
das Rechnungsjahr 1969.
82Robert Stephens, Germans on Drugs: The Complica-
tions of Modernisation in Hamburg (Ann Arbor: Uni-
versity of Michigan Press, 2007), 249–80.
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From its inception in 1967, the BZGA adopted a strategy of evaluating and attempting to
influence individual behaviour. The office took over work in progress from its predecessor,
the DGM, including an anti-smoking brochure entitledWas stimmt nun eigentlich?.83 The
BZGA also commissioned an extensive evaluation of smoking habits among young people,
including gaining feedback on the brochure. Like studies in Britain at the time, this evalu-
ation, was based on behavioural psychology.84 It was extensively referenced with inter-
national literature and was one of a series of such commissioned studies which drew
heavily on English-language literature, demonstrating a use of expert knowledge beyond
Germany as the basis of policy.85 There were also studies in West Germany looking at
female smoking, similarly referenced, but male adult smoking culture remained beyond
reach.86
The brochure,Was stimmt nun eigentlich?, explicitly addressed cigarette advertising, en-
couraging youngpeople to think about themessages such advertising imparted. The timing
of this brochure, a year after the voluntary agreement on cigarette advertising had been
signed, suggests some acknowledgement that the agreementwould achieve little. Archival
material relating to thedevelopmentof thebrochureby theDGMinitially shows that the cig-
arette industry was seen as a credible partner. This is distinct from the case in Britain where
polarised discourses in relation to smoking and health were already beginning to emerge
between the tobacco industry, on one hand, and medical and public health interests
within and beyond government on the other.87 The content of the brochure came from
both independent medical experts and scientific researchers at the industry-funded Wis-
senschaftliche Forschungsstelle der Verband der Zigarettenindustrie, including literature,
statistical data, glossy images and previous advertising slogans.88 The BZGA do not
appear to have continued links with the tobacco industry, suggesting that the creation of
this office possibly had some effect in shifting the political alliances.
Theevaluationof thebrochure, conducted in1968, suggested readers saw the content as
an advertisement for the cigarette industry; interviewees were incredulous that it was
intended to be against smoking.89 The evaluation discussed the reasons young people
smoked: it was seen as a routine and accepted part of adult behaviour. Children observed
that smoking was pleasurable for adults; that possessing a packet of cigarettes was seen
to be important, and lacking cigarettes caused discomfort. Further, smoking was prevalent
in popular culture: the cigarettewas seen as the pre-requisite ofmodern heroes—the gang-
ster, detective or secret agent of youth literature, for example. The young personwanted to
participate in this positive image of the smoker, who was seen as ‘lively, modern,
83BArch B310/15 Bundesministerium für Gesundheits-
wesen to Bundeszentrale fürGesundheitlicheAufklär-
ung, 25 September 1968.
84On British studies, see Berridge,Marketing Health, 75;
for the German evaluation, see BArch 310/520 Jugen-
dliche und Rauchen: Analysen des Raucher- und Nich-
traucherverhaltens, February 1969.
85See for example, BArch B310/537 Zum Einfluβ der
Zigarettenwerbung auf den Konsum von Zigaretten
bei Jugendlichen, Jan 1970, where all bar two of the
38 references came from English language sources.
86For studies relating to female smoking, see BArch 310/
230 ‘Arbeitsvorschlag für die Durchführung einer
psychologischen Studie zum Thema “Frauen und
Rauchen”’ 15 September 1972; the study was
carried out in November of that year.
87Virginia Berridge ‘The Policy Response to the Smoking
and LungCancerConnection in the1950sand1960s’,
The Historical Journal, 2006, 49, 1185–209, 1201.
88BArch B310/12 Bericht über meinen Besuch bei der
Wissenschaftliche Forschungsstelle im Verband der
Zigarettenindustrie, Hamburg, 6 December 1966.
89BArchB310/520 JugendlicheundRauchen,Teil II, Bun-
deszentrale für Gesundheitliche Aufklärung, p. 9.
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independent, chic, desirable, dynamic’, and ‘not too stiff or rigid in his principles’.90 The
authors of the evaluation noted that young people identified with the smokers in the bro-
chure, noting that, for young people, ‘the fear of not being up-to-date any longer [was]
at least as strong, if not stronger, than the fear of not being physically fit any more’.91
Even the concept of fitness was inverted to make smoking a positive choice. Respondents
suggested that smokers ‘could afford’ to smoke—a point understood in both financial
and physical terms. Given that the dangers of smoking were well known by this point,
being able to tolerate cigarettes was seen as a mark of a strong, solid man. Primarily,
smoking was about being perceived as an adult.
On the other hand, non-smokers were seen as hen-pecked paragons of virtue, industrious
people who were not only anxiously concerned about their own health, but wanted to
educate and convert others to non-smoking. The report argued that ‘[n]on-smokers are not
directly rejected, but often pitied, because they lack joie de vivre and pleasure. They are
easily marked as outsiders’.92 If non-smoking was unattractive, regulation was seen as even
more problematic. The evaluation concluded that prohibiting smoking would ‘just make it
harder for young people to give up’ as smoking would become a means of protest.93 The
report’s authors were explicitly aware of the context of the generational conflicts of the late
1960s.
While British health education research focused on creating mass poster campaigns, the
WestGermanNeue Trend campaignwas an attempt to engagewith youth culture.94 It was
multi-faceted, drawing in the popular youthmagazine,BRAVO, creatingmock fanzines and
lesson plans, as well as using more traditional means such as posters. The media section of
the campaign was run by a youth group called ‘Yeah Import from Great Britain Agents’
(Yeah for short; English in the original) in Munich with the support of the BZgA. This can
be seen as an attempt to make the campaign hip and trendy, to distance the campaign
from the government, and to draw on the trend towards greater internationalisation of
young people.95 Material attempted to position smoking as no longer cool. Cartoons
made the comparison between cigarettes and dummies, comparing smoking with a baby
sucking a dummy, and undermining associations of smoking with masculine adulthood.
The organisation also attempted to utilise peer pressure: readers were encouraged to set
up non-smokers’ clubs (called Anti-Tabakschnuller Clubs or Anti-Tobacco Dummy Clubs)
and to send away for a free badge that read ‘I can smoke too’, allegedly making the need
to prove this superfluous.96
Describing this campaign at the Second World Conference on Smoking and Health in
1971, Dr Fritsche, President of the BZGA, explained: ‘we found that young adolescent teen-
agersdidnot trust adults… to talk to themabout smoking…material is only acceptedwhen
we use the channels that teenagers use themselves’. Fritsche was speaking alongside
90BArch B310/520 Jugendliche undRauchen, Teil II, p. 8;
25.
91BArch B310/520 Jugendliche undRauchen, Teil II, p. 5.
92BArch B310/520 Jugendliche und Rauchen, study by
the Arbeitsgemeinschaft für Sozial und Wirtschafts-
forschung, Köln, February 1969, 27.
93BArch B310/520 Jugendliche und Rauchen, Teil I, Bun-
deszentrale für Gesundheitliche Aufklärung, 30.
94Berridge,Marketing Health, 75.
95BArch B310/523 Qualitative Erfolgskontrolle der
Anti-Raucher-Kampagne “Der neue trend—No
smoking please”: psychologische Analyse zum Ver-
ständnis jugendlicher Raucher und Nichtraucher:
Ergebnisse’, 1972, 1 details the background to the
campaign.
96BArch B310/250 Peter’s Flugblatt Nr 1, also in B310/
739.
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experts fromcountriesworldwide. Thedelegate list shows that,whilemostwere fromBritish
or North American backgrounds, West Germany was reasonably represented. Despite
attempts to position the campaign as a teenage initiative, Fritsche’s use of the word ‘we’
to describe the conceptualisation and implementation of the campaign shows where the
impetus came from.97
Thecampaignwasshapedbya recognition that leisure time ingeneral, and teenageculture
particularly, was changing, as were family lifestyles. Teenagers and young people had more
free time, more disposable income and were growing up in a culture of affluence. This was
also explicit in cigarette advertising: the introduction of a curriculum on alcohol and drug
use, including smoking, explained to teachers that tobacco advertising promised a range of
positive effects, including ‘Genuss im Stil der neuen Zeit (Progressivität)’ (Enjoyment in the
style of the new era (progressivity)).98 This was the slogan from a successful advertising cam-
paign of the early 1960s for Lord Extra cigarettes, showing that cigarette advertising captured
broader desires tomove on from the past. As Lord Extrawas the first ‘light’ (low tar, low nico-
tine) cigarette introduced inWest Germany (by the Hamburg-based branch of British Ameri-
canTobacco), the slogan inferred that smoking in thepost-warera addressedhealth concerns
with a new style of smoking. The BZGA campaign indicated unease with rampant consumer
culture, whilst recognising the attraction of new beginnings.
Healtheducation centredonteachingchildren todevelopa critical awarenessof advertising,
and presenting alternatives to smoking. One curriculum plan, aimed at 9–10 year olds, was
madeupof four two-hour sessions. The focuswasonanalysing images in cigarette advertising
(motifs of friendship, leisure, happiness, youth, beauty, health). Children were encouraged to
discuss whether these situations reflected the reality of when people smoked (under stress, in
everyday lifesituationssuchasonatrain,aftereating,etc.). Pupilswereaskedtocreateacollage
frommagazines to showhowthey imaginednon-smokers tobe, differentiating themfrom the
previous set of adverts discussed. Pupilswere supposed tounderstand that therearenonotice-
abledifferencesbetweensmokersandnon-smokersandbeencouragedto thinkofalternatives
to smoking—swimming, sport, cycling, doing art and crafts, and so on.99 This lesson did not
mention health risks, focusing on patterns of behaviour and cultural understandings of
smoking. The aimwas to create positive values around non-smoking.
Thenext two lessonsaimedtoenable youngpeople tobe informed, rational andaboveall,
confident citizensmaking responsible choices. These classes addressedpeer pressure, using
a strip cartoon of four friends, as research showed that friendship groupswere a key site for
smoking initiation. The lessons encouraged pupils to understand that conflict situations
could develop within a group and to learn techniques to resolve such situations. The main
character, Peter,metwithhis friends togosledging;onehadbrought cigarettes andencour-
aged the others to try them instead of going sledging. Pupils were asked to consider Peter’s
possible reasons for smoking and for not smoking, and to enact these in a role play.100 In the
next class, pupils were given two printed alternative endings to the story to consider. The
endings, neither of which show Peter smoking, demonstrate, respectively, Peter ‘exercising
97W. E. P. Fritsche, ‘An anti-smoking campaign among
schoolchildren in Germany’, in Robert G Richardson,
Proceedings of the Second World Conference on
Smoking and Health (London: Pitman Medical, 1972)
77; 79.
98BArch B310/506 Gesundheiterziehung und Schule:
Curriculum: Alkohol, Selbstmedikation, Werbung
und Gesundheit, Rauchen und Gesundheit, 1974.
99Ibid., 73—6.
100Ibid., 77—88.
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his own free will’ and leaving, and ‘looking for support from another groupmember’. Both
examples aimed to provide pupils with the means of taking responsibility for their own be-
havioural decisions and not simply submitting to the will of the group. Children were asked
to talkabout their experiencesofpeerpressure, and to considerhowthismade themfeel.101
The last lessonwasamore traditional lessonabout thedangerous substances in cigarettes
and cigarette smoke, demonstrated through experimentation.102 These lessons were part
of a wider curriculum on alcohol, self-medication, advertising and health. Alongside inter-
ventions to children, parents and educators were targeted with a brochure outlining 12
tips for preventing drug use amongst children. The tips included making sure drugs
(alcohol, cigarettes, tablets) were not accessible to children, raising the self-confidence
and self-esteem of children, and teaching them ways of resolving emotional difficulties.
Other tips included not setting a bad example; avoiding tensions within the family; being
interested in children’s schoolworkor apprenticeship; beingwilling to lendanear aboutpro-
blems; providing children with places to play and spend leisure time; and raising conscious-
ness about drugs. This went far beyond telling parents that smoking, drinking or taking
drugs damages health, and even how to talk to their children about smoking and other
drug use. Although there was no explicit connection, this broad awareness of health
within society canbe read through the lensof the1948WorldHealthOrganisationdefinition
of health: ‘health is a state of complete physical, mental and social well-being, and not
merely the absence of disease or infirmity’.103 The brochure suggested ways parents
could improve family life and children’s upbringing to remove the need formood enhancing
substances. The rationale was that drug use was a result of social and familial problems. As
the brochure noted, ‘discontentwith social andpolitical relationships [could] be a trigger for
drug misuse’.104 The text suggested engaging young people in doing social good—for
example, helping young disabled people or the aged, supporting Amnesty International,
or even owning and caring for a pet. To quote ‘[s]uch voluntary work helps against the
pains of the world’, and was supposed to make young people into better citizens.105
By the mid-1970s, health education initiatives against smoking were part of wider cam-
paigns against drug use. This can be seen in the context of increasing concerns about illegal
drug use and the growth of the hippie culture at an international level.106 Staff from the
BZGA were involved in UNESCO initiatves: a conference in 1972 set out a clear approach
to anti-drugs education, suggesting campaigns against druguse shouldbeabout increasing
the opportunities for intellectual, emotional, psychological and physiological development
of youngpeople.Drugs education should, the conference recommended, bepart of general
education and the responsibility of the whole community; health education programmes
101Ibid., 89—97.
102Ibid., 98—104.
103Preamble to the Constitution of theWorld Health Or-
ganization as adopted by the International Health
Conference, New York, 19 June–22 July 1946;
signed on 22 July 1946 by the representatives of 61
States (Official Records of theWorldHealthOrganiza-
tion, no. 2, p. 100) and entered into force on 7 April
1948. The definition has not been amended since
1948.
104BArch B310/252 Vorbeugen ist Besser also Drogen:
Eziehungstips für Eltern zum Thema Drogenmiβ-
brauch (Bundeszentrale für gesundheitliche Aufklär-
ung, 1973), 11.
105Ibid., 11.
106Robert Stephens, ‘Drugs, Consumption and Inter-
nationalisation in Hamburg, 1960—1968’, in David
F. Crew, Consuming Germany in the Cold War
(Oxford, New York: Berg, 2003), 179–206.
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should engage not just with individuals, but the ‘whole environmental system in which the
individual lives’.107 This approach drew on drug education programmes from the United
States, with the aim that ‘[t]hrough the development and consolidation of the values of
the young person, these will be then be internalised and communicated in behaviour’.108
Thus, by the early 1970s, health education ondrug use, including smoking, clearly focused
on young peoples’ sense of self. ‘Values education’ linked to the ideas behind the late 1960s
Neue Trendhealth education programmewhich sought towin pupils over emotionally to the
positive values of non-smoking. There was also a recognition, after the youth protest move-
ments of the later 1960s, that teenagers and young people should play an important part
of shaping a more liberal and democratic society. As Siegfried has argued, young people in-
creasingly took on a ‘role as paradigms for the handling of consumer society’s opportunities
[aswell as] advocating theexpansionofdemocraticways’.109 TheBZGAcampaigns sought to
to teach children to question themessages they recieved from those in authority and through
consumer culture; toquestion theplaceof smoking in theworld theyweregrowingup in; and
to question the behaviour of their parents and peerswho smoked. Childrenwere then ideally
in a position tomake an informed decision (although this decision was expected to be not to
smoke), justify and be confident about it. Parents and educators were asked to provide a har-
monious, peaceful environment where children could express themselves, contribute and
become valued citizens in their own right. This would, in the eyes of the BZGA, remove the
need to smoke.
The youth smoking campaignwas themost prominentmeasure undertakenby the BZGA
in the early 1970s to address smoking. Othermeasures included research into smoking ces-
sation programmes, and a campaign to persuade official government bodies to restrict
smoking in meetings and common spaces. The underlying rationale was ‘persuasion, not
force’, with citizens’ behaviour to be shaped through education and rational thought,
through knowledge of risk, rather than regulation. This fits within the neo-liberal context
where, as Johanna Oksala has argued, individuals are expected to make ‘strategic choices
between the most effective means, ways and instruments [and] to be able to calculate
costs, risks and possible returns’.110 The focus was not only on smoking and health, but
the broader individual and social gains to be made by not smoking.
The Route to Restrictions on TVAdvertising
The emphasis on self-regulation and choice continued to frame policy discussions about
smoking and health in the run up to the passage of the revised Food Law in 1974. The inclu-
sionof a clause oncigarette advertising in this lawhadbeenmooted for some time; theearli-
est suggestion I have found is in correspondence around theNikotinverordnung in 1959.111
Correspondence in 1966 refers to the use of legislativemeasures to prohibit advertising but
is not specificwhatmeasures aremeant. The prohibition of TV and radio advertising in 1974
107BArch B310/252 Bericht über die Arbeitstagung der
UNESCO: Erziehung zur Verhütung des Drogenmis-
brauchs in entwickelten Ländern, Paris 11. Bis 20.
Dezember, 16 January 1973, 5.
108Ibid., p. 5.
109Siegfried, ‘Don’t Trust Anyone over 30?’ 744.
110Johanna Oksala, ‘From Biopower to Governmental-
ity’, in Christopher Falzon, Timothy O’Leary and
Jana Sawicki, A Companion to Foucault (London:
Blackwell Publishing Ltd), 333.
111PFR480, 11Notiz zurVdC-Beiratssitzung:Gedanken-
gänge zum Thema: Nikotin-Verordnung, 8 May
1959.
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did provide statutory regulation on smoking, but was far less than the cigarette industry
expected and medical campaigners advocated. An internal memo from British American
Tobacco of a 1969meeting in Hamburg with G. F. Todd, director of the British Tobacco Re-
searchCouncil, anticipatedwarning labels,maximumtar levels, andminimumfilter efficien-
cies aswell as advertising restrictions. Schlenker (chairmanof the boardof theWestGerman
research institute, also present) was clear that West German cigarette manufacturers were
willing to give up TV advertising if pressure for legislation became too great.112
This memo emphasised good levels of cooperation between theWest German cigarette
industry and its British counterparts, which ‘worked reasonablywell’. Thememo referred to
information exchanges betweenGermany andDenmark; andbetweenBritain, Holland and
Norway.A1969document from theNationalClearingHouse for Smoking andHealth in the
UnitedStates comparing tobaccopolicies in22countrieswascirculatedanddiscussedby the
cigarette industry internationally and government ministries in West Germany.113 The im-
portance attached to this document suggestsWestGermaneyes lookedoutwards in formu-
lating their policy response. This viewpoint can also be found within West German
government: the Ministry of Economic Affairs compared smoking policies, cigarette con-
sumption and levels of cigarette advertising in various Western countries.114 The cigarette
industry also adopted a strategy of international comparison, referencing the lack of com-
petition in state tobacco monopolies and arguing that an inability to advertise impacted
on innovation in lower tar and lower nicotine brands.115
The revision of the Food Law began to be planned in 1965 but did not include anything
relating to tobacco.116 Incorporating a clause on smoking was discussed in the Bundestag
and the Bundesrat in late 1968; and initially was further ranging than restricting TV adver-
tising—including prohibiting all additives to tobacco which would have had far-reaching
implications for the import of US tobacco.117 By September 1969, correspondence
between government and internal cigarette industry shows the BMJFG (Bundesministerium
für Jugend, Familie undGesundheit, which the BGMbecame in 1969) in talks with the VdC
about advertising in particular. The 1966 voluntary agreement was thereaftfer extended to
cover staggeredwithdrawal fromTVand radio advertising. The agreementnow includedUS
multinational Philip Morris.118 The government supported the extension of the voluntary
agreement on the grounds that ‘free co-operation’ would be more effective than going
through legal channels.119By1973, aproblemwith theextendedagreementwas compliance
by ‘outside’ (i.e. nonWest-German) companies. Therewere differences in approachbetween
112Confidential memo: discussions in Germany, 8 and 9
July 1959, Legacy Tobacco Documents, Bates no:
1003118503/8507.
113National Clearing House for Smoking and Health:
Smoking and Health Programs in other countries, 2
January 1969, Legacy Tobacco Documents, Bates
no: LG0067559-LG0067572.
114BArch B102/278195 Entwicklung des Cigarettenab-
satzes sowie Werbebeschränkungen und Werbever-
bote, undated, but around early 1974 from filing
position.
115BArch B102/278195 Verband der Cigarettenindus-
trie to Bunderswirtschaftsministerium, 10 August
1973.
116BArch B189/1427Various correspondence on setting
up committee and remit, dating from October 1965.
117Gesundheitsbericht, Drucksache VI/1667, Deutscher
Bundestag, 6. Wahlperiode, 18 December 1970, 97.
118BArch B102/278194 ‘Vereinbarung über eine Bes-
chränkung er Fernsehwerbung für Cigaretten’, 23
July 1971, extracted in a report from Bundesminister
für Wirtschaft und Finanzen, 14 March 1972.
119BArch B102/278193 Extract, Drucksache 73/71, Bun-
desrat; Bundesminister Frau Strobel, Deutscher Bun-
destag, 130. Sitzung, 23 July 1971, 7599C.
Cigarette Advertising in Post-war West Germany, 1950s–1975 Page 19 of 23
 at Periodicals D
ept on M
arch 26, 2015
http://shm
.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
German firms who had a long standing history with the (West) German government and US
multinational PhilipMorris, whose undisclosed aimwas to reduce the restraintswhich the ad-
vertising code placed on them.120
As in 1966, the Bundeskartellamt complained about the extended voluntary agreement
being in breach of the GWB and advocated legislation to achieve the health aims.121 The
office argued that agreements to restrict competition could only come into consideration
when there were no legal means available, or such means were not timely. When such re-
striction was necessary, the Office argued, the state was better able to protect the interests
of all interested parties.122 Quantitative agreements on restricting advertising, such as stop-
ping TV and radio advertising, were against the law; but the agreement was authorised
under paragraph 8 of the GWB, which allowed for Ministerial Authorisation.
Through the early 1970s, there was increased media and medical pressure to use the Food
Lawreformasavehicle toenact legal restrictionsonsmoking,under the rubricof consumerpro-
tection.123Thecigarette industryheldaconsistentpositionasevidenced intheformal statement
by theVdCto theCommittee considering theFoodLaw in theBundestag inMarch1972,and in
draft statementsandcorrespondence.TheVdCsought topresentmanufacturersas responsive
to the health risks (highlighting industry research into the chemical components of tobacco
smoke combinedwith animal experiments from the early 1950s onwards) and as responsible
(having voluntarily restricted advertising). The cigarette industry also sought to minimise the
dangers of smoking in a manner different to the denialism Proctor posits for the US case
and earlier decades in Germany. By the early 1970s, there was an expressed acceptance of
the health risks, but concerns were downplayed. The VdC distanced the West German
product and thereforeWest German cigarette manufacturers from international health con-
cerns inboth timeand space. Thecigarette inWestGermany in theearly1970s couldnot, they
asserted, be comparedwith the cigarette for sale 30–40 years previously in theUSAor theUK
‘either in respect of the quantity of smoke constituents or of its biological activity’.124
The VdC argued that advertising allowed the smoking public tomake informed choices and
promotedbrandswitchingto ‘healthier’alternatives (as the filter cigarettewasconstructed). The
billionsofDeutschmarksspentonadvertisingwere justified in termsofpublichealth,drawingon
the rhetoric of choice. In a paragraph worth quoting in full to show how the debate was
re-framed, the statement compared the risks of smoking to the social risks of illicit drugs:
120Letter from Gunnarsson to Starck, 25 June 1973 (the
letter refers to legal advice Philip Morris Europe has
taken and the need to build contacts with individuals
or groups who can exert counter pressure on the
Health Minister), Legacy Tobacco Documents
Online, Bates no 2073421985.
121For thedebateoverwhether therewasabreachof the
GWB, see BArch B102/278194 Internal memo:
Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Neuordnun und Bereini-
gung des Rechts im Verkehrmit Lebensmitteln, Taka-
kerzeugnissen, kosmetischen Mitteln und sonstigen
Bedarfsgegenständen (Gesetz zur Gesamtreform
des Lebensmittelrechts), 26 May 1971.
122BArch B102/278194 Bundesministerium für
Wirtschaft und Finanzen an den Bundesminister für
Jugend, Familie und Gesundheit, 7 September 1971.
123BArch B189/1417 Extract: Erster Europäischer
Kongreβ ‘Rauchen und Gesundheit’, 6—9 Septem-
ber 1971, Bad Homburg: Empfehlungen an die
Regierungen der Staaten Europas; Der Spiegel,
‘Werbung: Zigaretten: Angst vor Käte’, 26 October
1970, no. 44, 104—5; Deutsche Bundestag, Druck-
sache 7/7020, 10 May 1974, 12.
124
‘Smoking and Health’: the viewpoint of the Asso-
ciatedGermanCigarette Industry, copiedwith corres-
pondence dated 7 March 1972, Legacy Tobacco
Documents, Bates no: 2025023388/3407.
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If one accepts the thesis that human nature will not change in the forseeable future,
then one can predict with certainty that humanity will employ pharmaceutical aids in
its search for contentment. [It is] in the best interest of public health that this should
be done with substances which involve the least risk both for the individual and for
society as a whole. If one applies this principle to tobacco, then it must once again
be emphasised that the danger, serious though it may be, exists in relation to the indi-
vidual, as opposed to which the uncontrolled use of stronger, pharmacological sub-
stances throws up a multiplicty of social problems which today constitute a matter of
great concern for the government [author’s emphasis].125
The statement can be understood in the context of broader social concerns around
recreational drug use, particularly among young people, alluded to at the opening of this
paper. Whereas the BZGA sought to associate all drugs with social and personal harm,
the cigarette industry sought to delineate between them, positioning the cigarette as the
socially safer alternative. The industry position emphasised individual risk, which put
smoking beyond the bounds of legitimate government action. The statement also para-
phrased the liberal maxim: ‘(only) as much government as necessary; as much freedom as
possible’, which has clear resonance with the economic liberalism developing from the
1950s.
The BMJFG, for their part, published a number of lengthy and hard-hitting parliamentary
responses dealing fullywith the international epidemiological andmedical evidence against
smoking. One in 1974 accepted the international consensus that action was needed, and
rejected many of the tobacco industry arguments against such action. Nonetheless, minis-
ters fell back on the rhetoric of informed choice, stating: ‘No-one intends to treat mature
citizens as children and force healthy behaviour by laws or pressure. It must be the goal to
awaken reason and criticism.’126
In short, despite being aware of and accepting the incontrovertible evidence against
smoking on health grounds, the government accepted the premise that the state should
not legislate on individual behaviours. Many such statements concluded by evoking the
duality of freedom and responsibility. This position is in linewith social and economic devel-
opments over the previous two decades, and can be understood in the context of the
neo-liberal citizen exercising rational, self-interested choice. This context helps to explain
the lack of action in the decades to follow.
Conclusion
The development of smoking policy in the 1960s and early 1970s in West Germany shows
that attitudes towards smoking were formed and maintained in spite of knowledge of the
international epidemiological case against smoking, rather than in ignorance or denial of it.
Debates aroundcigarette advertisingwithinWestGermanyarepart of thewiderglobal story
about an emerging response to smoking as a threat to health. Both the Federal Ministry of
Health and the FederalMinistry of Economic Affairs were aware of and referred to the inter-
national context when discussing cigarette advertising. The health education response can
also be seen within an international framework—not only because the impetus to action
125
‘Smoking and Health’, 17. 126Deutscher Bundestag, 7/2070, 10 May 1974, 11.
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came from influential British and US government reports on smoking, but because the use
of social psychology to informpolicywas an approach thatwas also apparent elsewhere. By
the 1970s, one sees the influence of values education in anti-drugs education, an approach
specifically promoted by UNESCO. In West German health education in the 1970s, drugs
were understood in the widest possible sense. Thus, the West German response
to smoking was in many ways an international story, demonstrating a shift towards an
international outlook.
Nonetheless, theparticular national context ofWestGermany, particularly theexperience
of fascism and the economic and social rebuilding of the immediate post-war years, had an
effect going beyond privacy regarding health matters. The neo-liberal economic context of
post-warWest Germanyworked against any significant restriction of tobacco advertising or
sales. The commitment to free trade within the social market economywas seen as integral
to the maintenance of democracy in the post-fascist state. Health education and the
research informing it can be located in the post-war move towards an advanced liberal
society. The background of 1968 and the perceived generational conflict of the period
prompted a desire to move away from a didactic form of health education which ‘talked
down’ to children and young people. This was replaced by a form of health education
which sought to create citizens of the future, capable of exercising a choice within a demo-
cratic society, rather than coercing themor frightening them intopatterns of behaviour. This
fits into analyses which stress neo-liberal forms of governmentality in shaping personal
behaviour, in contrast to the overtly authoritarian anti-smoking campaigns of the Third
Reich. The West German campaigns also contrast to the ‘shock’ and stigmatising tactics
used in mass media advertising in the 1970s in the British case, and the earlier 1960s in
West Germany.
The influence of the cigarette industry is undeniable throughout the period; roots of later
twentieth-century relationships between the cigarette industry, scientists and the West
German government can already be found in the immediate post-war years. Transnational
networks were also emerging between West Germany, other European and US cigarette
manufacturers. However, the cigarette industry in the 1950s was qualitatively and quanti-
tatively different from that of the later twentieth century. The key players in the 1950s
and 1960s in West Germany were West German family firm, Reemtsma, and the cigarette
manufacturer’s association, the VdC, which mainly includedWest Germanmanufacturers.
By the late 1970s, multinationals such as Philip Morris and RJ Reynolds were increasingly
directing the agenda. By the 1980s, the West German government was negotiating with,
and being lobbied, by a multinational, multibillion dollar industry which was not the case
in the 1950s.
Finally, understanding West German tobacco policy in its international context provides
an intriguing perspective on global issues around smoking and health. The early emphasis
on individual freedom coupled with responsibility helps to explain why tobacco industry
arguments fell on fertile ground in West Germany. The larger argument was not about
smoking and health but about the appropriate role of the state, relating to both the
legitimacy of market regulation and the regulation of personal behaviour. Just as links
can be seen between the cigarette manufacturer, Reemstma, and the development of
Ordoliberalism, British American Tobacco financially supported the British Institute of
Economic Affairs, a right-wing think tank which disseminated neo-liberal ideals in Britain
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in the1970s.127 Following these leadsmayhelp toexplainwhydebatesaroundsmokingand
health developed in similar ways in differentWestern countries in the 1960s and 1970s and
why liberal arguments persisted in the face of increasing evidence of the health risks. There
was not only an internationalisation of medical understandings of smoking as a risk to
health, but the growth of transnational networks promoting discourses of individual
economic and social freedom and challenging the role of the state in regulating individual
behaviour, which went beyond the cigarette industry. The story of smoking in West
Germany is an important part of these developments.
127Neil Rollings, ‘Cracks in the Post-war Keynesian
Settlement?: The Role of Organised Business in
Britain in the Rise of Neoliberalism before Margaret
Thatcher’, Twentieth Century British History, 2013,
24, 639.
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